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GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.† & DANA A. REMUS†† 
A central and ongoing debate among legal ethics scholars addresses the mor-
al positioning of adversarial advocacy.  Most participants in this debate focus on 
the structure of our legal system and the constituent role of the lawyer-advocate.  
Many are highly critical, arguing that the core structure of adversarial advocacy 
is the root cause of many instances of lawyer misconduct.  In this Article, we ar-
gue that these scholars’ focuses are misguided.  Through reflection on Aristotle’s 
treatise, Rhetoric, we defend advocacy in our legal system’s litigation process as 
ethically positive and as pivotal to fair and effective dispute resolution.  We rec-
ognize that advocacy can, and sometimes does, involve improper and unethical 
use of adversarial techniques, but we demonstrate that these are problems of prac-
tice and not of structure and should be addressed as such.  
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INTRODUCTION 
A central and ongoing debate in legal ethics scholarship addresses 
the moral positioning of adversarial advocacy.  Professor Daniel Mar-
kovits brought renewed attention to this debate in his book, A Modern 
Legal Ethics.1  With rhetorical flair, the book opens by asserting that 
professional obligations for lawyers to act in unethical ways—to “lie” 
and to “cheat”—“are deeply ingrained in the genetic structure of ad-
versary advocacy.”2 
Other scholars have made similar allegations.  They, too, have lo-
cated the problems and deficiencies of advocacy within the structure 
of our system.  They, too, have argued that core principles of adver-
sarial ethics, including the duties of loyalty and confidentiality, are the 
root cause of unethical lawyer conduct.3 
Many scholars who have taken this position go on to argue that 
given the problem’s deep foundation in the structure of our system, it 
cannot be addressed through the extrinsic controls of the law govern-
ing lawyers; it can be remedied only through the intrinsic moral con-
ditioning of lawyers.  The solution, these critics conclude, is to rede-
fine the role of the lawyer-advocate to include direct responsibilities 
for truth and justice.4  Proposals along these lines are numerous.  
 
1 DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (2008). 
2 Id. at 2-4. 
3 For examples of such arguments, see infra note 4; see also MARKOVITS, supra note 
1, at 5 (“Fidelity, understood as a distinctively lawyerly virtue, offers lawyers their best 
hope for ethical vindication of their professional lives.”).  
4 See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 79-80, 83 (1980) (describing a 
report by “a commission of the American Bar Association” (for which one of us served 
as the reporter) that “considered, but did not adopt, a provision requiring the disclo-
sure of facts known to the lawyer which ‘would probably have a substantial effect on 
the determination of a material issue’” (internal quotation marks omitted)); ANTHONY 
T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 154 (1993) (“A legal education must do more than 
impart information and technical skills.  It must also inculcate the character-virtues of 
prudence and public-spiritedness.”); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 138 
(1998) (arguing that lawyers can defer to both “justice” and the existing legal frame-
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Judge Marvin Frankel once suggested that “the paramount commit-
ment of counsel concerning matters of fact should be to the discovery 
of truth rather than to the advancement of the client’s interest.”5  Pro-
fessor William Simon proposed a “basic maxim” that lawyers “take such 
actions as, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular 
case, seem likely to promote justice.”6  Professor David Luban pro-
posed that lawyers be held “morally accountable for what they do on 
behalf of clients and what outcomes they further.”7  And Professor An-
thony Kronman suggested redefining the lawyer-advocate’s role as that 
of a civic-minded “lawyer-statesman,” who would advise clients as to the 
course of action that was not only legal, but prudent and wise as well8—
a position that might be consistent with some forms of adversarial ad-
vocacy but would not be with others.  These and other proposals are 
unified by two common but problematic conclusions:  the adversarial 
system is to blame for problems of lawyer misconduct, and the proper 
solution lies in improving the internal moral constraints of lawyers. 
In the initial passages of A Modern Legal Ethics, Professor Markovits 
appears to locate the problems of advocacy in the requirements that 
advocacy imposes on lawyers as moral agents.  In doing so, he suggests 
potential agreement with the views and premises of these proposals.9  
 
work); Robert Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 
1031-35 (1981) (discussing the costs and benefits of adopting attorney disclosure rules 
and suggesting the benefits of “third-party disclosure obligations governed by a negli-
gence standard”); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth:  An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1031, 1056 (1975) (“We may want to ask . . . whether it would be an excessive 
price for the client to be stuck with the truth rather than having counsel allied with 
him for concealment and distortion.  The full development of this thought is beyond 
my studies to date.  Its implications may be unacceptable.  I only urge that it is among 
the premises in need of examination.”). 
5 Frankel, supra note 4, at 1055; see also id. at 1057 (“The rules of professional re-
sponsibility should compel disclosures of material facts and forbid material omissions 
rather than merely proscribe positive frauds.”).   
6 SIMON, supra note 4, at 9. 
7 David Luban, The Inevitability of Conscience:  A Response to My Critics, 93 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1437, 1437 (2008). 
8 KRONMAN, supra note 4, at 14, 147-55.  Existing professional rules permit, and 
competent representation requires, such counseling.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2009) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice.  In rendering advice, a lawyer may 
refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and 
political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.”).  
9 In outlining his argument, Markovits explains:  
First, lawyers’ professional obligations to behave in ways that would ordinarily 
be immoral are not simply the results of excessive or perverse partisanship.  
Instead, they are deeply ingrained in the genetic structure of adversary advo-
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As the book continues, however, he takes a different approach.  He 
disclaims advocacy’s truth-finding function and argues that advocacy 
must be understood and evaluated not against the first-person morali-
ty of the lawyer but instead against the goal of political legitimacy.  In 
this light, he contends, conduct that would otherwise be called lying 
and cheating is rendered far less problematic.10 
In this Article, we support and advance an approach to evaluate 
the role of the advocate by reference to a political need for authorita-
tive dispute resolution.  But we disagree that lawyers’ actions, if under-
taken in accordance with the standard rules governing advocacy, can 
or should be described as “lying” or “cheating.”  Both characteriza-
tions imply an access to ultimate truth, which all players in the legal 
system lack.  Professor Markovits’s comments in this regard may be in-
tended as rhetorical flourish,11 but they are nevertheless problematic 
 
cacy. . . . Second, while it may be that lawyers’ professional obligations to act 
in ordinarily immoral ways are necessary parts of a moral division of labor that 
best serves justice overall, this is not enough to redeem their professional eth-
ics. . . . And third, an alternative approach to legal ethics, which develops an 
account of distinctively lawyerly virtue to complement division of labor argu-
ments, can render lawyers’ lives ethically appealing and so bring their profes-
sional ethics to a successful conclusion. 
MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 2.  He also acknowledges that “although this vindication is 
possible in principle, recent developments in the structure of the legal profession 
threaten to deny contemporary lawyers practical access to the ideals on which it de-
pends.”  Id. at 2-3.  
10 See id. at 171 (“doubt[ing] whether integrity-preserving role-based redescription 
is ultimately of much practical use to modern lawyers”).  Professor Markovits’s ap-
proach of evaluating the role of the advocate by reference to the exigencies of practic-
al government has recently been embraced by others as well.  See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE 
COUNSEL OF ROGUES?  A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER’S 
ROLE 148 (2009) (responding to the argument that lawyers cannot “properly avoid 
moral censure by appeal to a distinct institutional morality” by arguing instead that 
“lawyers have moral grounds for regarding themselves as having duties to their clients 
which may allow or require them to act in ways which would be immoral were they act-
ing outside of their professional roles” (emphasis omitted)); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal 
Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 72 (2005) (“Lawyers 
may not treat the law instrumentally, as an obstacle to be planned around, but must 
treat legal norms as legitimate reasons for action in their practical deliberation.”); W. 
Bradley Wendel, Moral Judgment and Professional Legitimation, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1071, 
1073 (2007) (“Legal ethics differs in kind from ordinary ethics because the social func-
tion of the law is to settle normative disagreement procedurally and to adopt a provi-
sional social settlement of moral conflict that precludes acting on the basis of ordinary 
first-order moral reasons.”). 
11 We note that later in his book, Professor Markovits appears to accept that law-
yers’ actions should be understood not as lying and cheating but as means of facilitat-
ing a truth that is “good enough” to allow government to function.  MARKOVITS, supra 
note 1, at 171-73, 188-93.  
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in two ways.  First, they send the unfortunate message that law stu-
dents’ future line of work entails and requires dishonesty.  Second, 
they obscure the pivotal and ethically positive role of advocacy in the 
authoritative resolution of disputes in our legal system. 
In developing our argument, we draw on several insights from 
Aristotle’s treatise, Rhetoric.12  We find Aristotle’s analysis relevant and 
useful for two reasons.  First, Aristotle responds to Plato’s criticism, le-
veled in the Gorgias, that rhetoric is per se unethical.13  The arguments 
of many contemporary critics echo those of Plato,14 such that Aris-
totle’s defense is philosophically apposite.  Second, Rhetoric offers a 
critical perspective that, until recently,15 has been wanting in contem-
porary debate—namely that the role and function of advocacy must 
be understood by reference to its social context.16  Aristotle identifies 
two defining features of this context in ancient Athens, which are 
equally relevant today:  the inherent uncertainty in human knowledge 
 
12 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, reprinted in THE RHETORIC AND THE POETICS OF ARIS-
TOTLE 2 (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., Random House, Modern Library 
College ed. 1984). 
13 As Aristotle wrote, “if it be objected that one who uses such power of speech un-
justly might do great harm, that is a charge which may be made in common against all 
good things except virtue, and above all against things that are most useful.”  Id. bk. I, 
ch. 1, at 1355b.  See also PLATO, GORGIAS 463 (Walter Hamilton trans., Penguin Books 
1971) [hereinafter PLATO, GORGIAS] (“[W]hat I [Socrates] call oratory is a branch of 
something which certainly isn’t a fine or honourable pursuit.”).  We note, however, that 
in the Gorgias, Socrates concedes the possibility of positive use of rhetoric, and in the 
Phaedrus, he presents the possibility of a positive moral standing for rhetoric.  See id. at 
504 (“[T]he good orator, being also a man of knowledge, will have [righteousness and 
moderation] in view in any speech or action by which he seeks to influence the souls of 
men . . . .”); PLATO, PHAEDRUS 274B (R. Hackforth trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1952) 
(stating that “the art of speech” includes “both the true art and the false”).   
14 Plato’s criticism was twofold.  First, he argued that rhetoric lacked its own sub-
ject matter and allowed a speaker to persuade anyone about anything.  As a result, it 
was not a socially valuable art worthy of study but a mere “knack” for persuasion 
through “gratification and pleasure.”  PLATO, GORGIAS, supra note 13, at 462.  Second, 
Plato argued that rhetoric prioritized flattery of an audience over truth-finding.  See id. 
at 466 (suggesting, through Socrates, that oratory is “a branch of pandering”).  Many 
critics echo, or even explicitly cite, these arguments.  See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, 
Foreword:  Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE L.J. 955, 959 (1981). 
15 See supra note 10. 
16 Aristotle accepted Plato’s premise that rhetoric allows a speaker to persuade 
anyone about anything and that it can therefore have application in virtually any in-
terpersonal setting.  See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355b (“It is clear, 
then, that rhetoric is not bound up with a single definite class of subjects, but is as 
universal as dialectic . . . .”).  We question the need for this concession.  As we explain 
below, Aristotle demonstrates that rhetoric is necessarily constrained by two defining 
aspects of its context, see infra Section I.A, which means that rhetoric’s application is 
not truly limitless. 
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and affairs, and the social necessity for political action notwithstand-
ing that uncertainty.17  Aristotle’s insights in this regard provide the 
basis for an effective response to the critics who contend that the 
problems and difficulties of advocacy are inevitable features of our le-
gal system’s core structure. 
We begin our analysis in Part I by applying Aristotle’s insights to 
our adversarial system.  In doing so, we address a simplified model of 
advocacy.  We speak of advocacy in our legal system’s litigation process 
and not in negotiation or transactional work.18  Within the domain of 
litigation, we address advocates who act within the bounds of the law 
and ethics governing lawyers.  This simplified model has a limited re-
semblance to actual practice, but it allows for useful isolation of advo-
cacy’s legitimate and central function in our legal system.  This func-
tion, which many critics fail to appreciate, is to facilitate construction 
of an accepted and authoritative version of truth upon which disputes 
can be resolved and justice administered. 
In Part II, we turn from the core function of advocacy to its actual 
practice.  We recognize that advocacy is sometimes employed in im-
proper ways and to improper ends, but we argue that in our legal sys-
tem, these problems reside outside the core structure of adjudication 
and the authorized role of the advocate.  We therefore reject the sug-
gestion of many critics that the problems of advocacy are properly ad-
dressed by reconstituting our legal system.  We believe that solutions 
are better sought in the rules of procedure and evidence and in the 
law governing lawyers.  We leave the task of formulating specific 
reform proposals for future work, but we argue that it is through ex-
 
17 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1357a (“Most of the things about 
which we make decisions . . . present us with alternative possibilities. . . . [C]onclusions 
that state what is merely usual or possible must be drawn from premisses that do the 
same . . . .”).   
18 Some of the critiques that we address approach the role of advocates in com-
mon law systems as a single category, to be contrasted with the role of lawyers in civil 
law systems.  We find this approach problematic for two reasons.  First, the relationship 
between truth and the role of the advocate does not appear to correspond to differ-
ences between common law and civil law systems.  The formal definition of “legal 
counselor” does not differ substantially between civil law and common law systems; in 
fact, actual fulfillment of the role is much more strongly influenced by a regime’s am-
bient political culture, legal institutions, and social ethos than by its common law or 
civil law structure.  Second, the advocate’s role cannot and should not be abstracted 
from the institutions, practices, and norms of a specific regime.  Accordingly, we ad-
dress the practice of advocacy and the role of the lawyer-advocate in our contemporary 
legal system.  This becomes particularly important in subsection I.B.2 as we address the 
details of our litigation process. 
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trinsic regulatory controls that the moral risk of the advocate’s func-
tion can be set at an acceptable and desirable level. 
I.  IN DEFENSE OF ADVOCACY’S VALUE 
In Rhetoric, Aristotle addresses two principal settings in which rhe-
toric was employed in ancient Athens.  One is the forensic setting of the 
law courts; a second is the legislative setting of the deliberative assem-
bly.19  Both are characterized by two defining features:  the inherent un-
certainty of available information and the social necessity for public de-
cision and action.20  In this Part, we describe these features and the 
challenges to which they give rise.  We then argue that advocacy in our 
contemporary legal system should be understood and analyzed as a dis-
tinctive and necessary means of coping with these challenges. 
A.  Understanding Advocacy in Context 
1.  Ancient Athens 
At the heart of Aristotle’s explanation of the practice of rhetoric 
lies his distinction between two types of human knowledge—the 
theoretical and the practical.21  Theoretical knowledge, which is pur-
sued through a form of analysis and communication called “dialec-
tic,” is knowledge of metaphysics, mathematics, and the natural 
sciences.22  It gives rise to truths of the highest kind, absolute and 
universal truths about the world, called “demonstration[s].”23  Prac-
tical knowledge, in contrast, is pursued through a form of analysis 
 
19 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 3, at 1358b.  A third context discussed by 
Aristotle, but not relevant to our current analysis, is hortatory speech in praise of an 
honoree.  Id.  A fourth context, not addressed by Aristotle but relevant today, is ap-
peals to the electorate. 
20 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.   
21 See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, ch. 2, at 1139a,  ch. 3, at 1139b, ch. 5, 
at 1140a, ch. 7, at 1141a–b (Martin Ostwald trans., Prentice Hall 1999) (discussing prac-
tical and theoretical wisdom); see also JOSEPH DUNNE, BACK TO THE ROUGH GROUND:  
‘PHRONESIS’ AND ‘TECHNE’ IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND IN ARISTOTLE 237-74 (1993) 
(examining the distinctions that Aristotle makes between the two types of knowledge). 
22 ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. VI, ch. 7, at 1141a–b; see also ARISTOTLE, supra 
note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1354a (“Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.”). 
23 ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS, reprinted in PRIOR ANALYTICS AND POST-
ERIOR ANALYTICS 75, 76 (A.J. Jenkinson & G.R.G. Mure trans., Digireads.com 2006); 
see also Jonathan Barnes, Aristotle’s Theory of Demonstration, 14 PHRONESIS 123, 123-24 
(1969) (explaining Aristotle’s meaning of a “demonstration”).  The Pythagorean 
theorem is the classic example of a demonstration. 
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and communication called “rhetoric”—what we would today call ad-
vocacy.  It is a much less secure form of knowledge, which consists of 
information that individuals acquire and use in living, producing, 
and interacting.  It is the knowledge of ethics, politics, and human 
life generally.24  As opposed to the certainty of theoretical knowledge, 
practical knowledge is contingent and contextual.  In Aristotle’s 
words, it is at best “approximately” true.25 
The challenges of practical knowledge identified by Aristotle give 
rise to the central difficulty of human action.  An individual contem-
plating action can often make a reasonably accurate assessment of 
surrounding circumstances, but the dynamic and contingent nature of 
human life precludes anything approaching the certainty of a theoret-
ical “demonstration.”  Circumstances are always subject to change, in-
formation is always incomplete, and human action is always enveloped 
in some degree of uncertainty. 
In the law courts and the deliberative assembly of ancient Athens, 
members of the polis confronted these challenges of practical know-
ledge.  Sitting as judge and jury, they had to decide an accused’s guilt 
or innocence in the face of conflicting evidence, such as in the famous 
trial of Socrates.26  Sitting as a legislative body, they had to make public 
policy decisions, such as whether to proceed to war or to rely on dip-
lomacy, in the face of conflicting intelligence and recommendations.27 
Aristotle explains that these and similar situations demand deci-
sion and action as a matter of community necessity.  Decisions regard-
ing guilt and innocence, and right and wrong, need to be made lest a 
dispute’s disruptive effects persist between parties and in the commu-
nity at large.28  Decisions regarding matters of war and peace and oth-
er matters of public policy need to be made lest the community fall 
into confusion and defeat.  These decisions are unavoidable, for “the 
most essential of all . . . [is] a method of arriving at decisions about 
matters of expedience and justice as between one person and anoth-
 
24 ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. VI, ch. 8, at 1141b.  Practical knowledge encom-
passes both practical wisdom, which is concerned with deliberation, choice, and action, 
and techne or art, which is concerned with creation and production.  For a more tho-
rough description, see DUNNE, supra note 21, at 237. 
25 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1,  at 1355a. 
26 See id. ch. 3, at 1358b (explaining how rhetoric is used in the judicial context). 
27 See id. (explaining how rhetoric is used in the political context). 
28 See AESCHYLUS, THE LIBATION BEARERS 60-69, in THE ORESTEIA OF AESCHYLUS 75 
(Edward Wright Harle trans., Univ. Press of Am. 1994) (discussing Orestes’s submis-
sion to judgment for the murder of his mother at Apollo’s request).  
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er.”29  At the same time, these decisions can be extremely difficult.  
Their consequences and implications always will depend on a multi-
tude of unknown and unknowable factors, and they must be made on 
the basis of knowledge that is at best “approximately” true.30 
Aristotle explains that rhetoric, which “exists to affect the giving 
of decisions,”31 aids with this difficulty.  Rhetoric mediates the epis-
temological and moral difficulties of human action and decision in 
the face of uncertainty.  Significantly, it is only by understanding rhe-
toric’s social context that we can recognize this function.  It is also 
only by understanding rhetoric’s social context that we can compre-
hend the distinctive means by which it fulfills this function.  As we 
discuss below, these distinctive means necessarily diverge from the 
objective and disinterested analysis that would be appropriate in a di-
alectical pursuit of objective truth. 
2.  Our Litigation System 
Many accounts of modern advocacy fail to recognize or account 
for the fact that the two defining features of rhetoric’s ancient con-
text—uncertainty and social necessity for decision—are equally salient 
in our contemporary legal system.  Instead, both positive and negative 
accounts of contemporary adversarial advocacy often assume the ac-
cessibility of objective truth in the litigation process.  Sanguine pro-
ponents of our system argue that competition between partisan advo-
cates is the most effective way of ensuring that the objective truth of a 
dispute will emerge.32  Critics, meanwhile, contend that advocacy pays 
insufficient respect to, and may even obstruct realization of, objective 
truth.33  For example, Professor Simon criticizes the “dominant view” 
 
29 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS bk. VII, ch. 8, at 1328b (Trevor J. Saunders ed., T.A. 
Sinclair trans., Penguin Books rev. ed. 1992).  
30 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
31 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 15, at 1377b. 
32 These proponents contend that advocates’ responsibilities to investigate, dis-
cover, and present all relevant facts equip a tribunal to piece together the truth of a 
legal dispute.  See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAW-
YERS’ ETHICS § 2.10 (3d ed. 2004) (“Our constitutional adversary system is based in 
part on the premise that the adversary system is more effective in the search for 
truth.”); E. Allan Lind et al., Discovery and Presentation of Evidence in Adversary and Non-
adversary Proceedings, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1141-43 (1973) (explaining why “adversary 
role structure seems most congruent with a public policy requiring overwhelming 
proof before a verdict can be rendered”).  
33 See Frankel, supra note 4, at 1032 (“[O]ur adversary system rates truth too low 
among the values that institutions of justice are meant to serve.”); Peter J. Riga, The 
Nature of Truth and Dissent, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 76 (1995) (“How can we teach law stu-
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of adversarial ethics for failing to account consciously and adequately 
for objective truth and justice.34  And Professor Kronman criticizes the 
training lawyers receive in the technique of advocacy for encouraging 
“a kind of cynicism” regarding lawyers’ efforts to access the objective 
truth of a dispute.35  Even Professor Markovits, who eschews advocacy’s 
truth-seeking function, describes advocacy as requiring lawyers to 
suppress their “correctly” and “properly” held views in favor of their 
clients’ views.36  This characterization assumes that lawyers have access 
to “correct” and “proper” views in the first place. 
The assumption that lawyers, judges, and jurors can access the ob-
jective truth of a litigated legal dispute is incorrect and unwarranted.37  
As an initial matter, and as Aristotle explains, uncertainty inheres in 
any context of “practical knowledge”—any context of human affairs.38  
This uncertainty is heightened in the subset of human relationships 
that deteriorate into litigation.  Litigation signifies that the parties lack 
a shared understanding of the facts and differ over proper application 
of the law.  The parties may agree on some facts—for example, who 
owned a particular car, who completed the accounting, or who was 
formally responsible for compliance measures—but, by definition, 
they will disagree on others.  Similarly, they may agree on some as-
pects of applicable law but will necessarily disagree on others. 
The engagement of lawyers will not dissipate the disagreement or 
clarify the objective truth of a dispute.  At the outset, a lawyer receives 
 
dents to be morally sensitive to the truth as the highest value in the law and the legal 
system? . . . Too often truth is secondary to procedure, to winning, to partisanship.”); 
see also infra notes 34-37 (discussing the pursuit of objective truth in litigation). 
34 See SIMON, supra note 4, at 138 (arguing that “[l]awyers should take actions 
that, considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to 
promote justice”).  
35 Kronman, supra note 14, at 964. 
36 MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 3-4.  
37 We do not dispute that there are such things as “true”—or at least undisputed—
facts in human relationships, recognized by lawyers as well as everyone else.  For ex-
ample, George Washington was the first United States President and Barack Obama 
the most recent.  Moreover, we recognize the notion of “true truth”—if understood as 
a sense of reality shared within a community—to be the foundation of noncontentious 
human relationships.  But the role of the forensic advocate is inapposite to situations 
of social harmony.  The forensic advocate engages in a very limited subset of human 
interactions that involve legal disputes, where the parties may agree upon some facts 
and norms but by definition do not agree on others.  
38 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 21, bk. I, ch. 3, at 1094b (arguing that just as precision 
is difficult to achieve in “manufactured articles,” so, too, is precision difficult to achieve 
in the search for knowledge); see also DUNNE, supra note 21, at 255 (“[E]lements of op-
portunity and luck . . . form a kind of penumbra around the clear light of rationality 
that the Socratic philosophers were trying to reveal.”). 
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only one side of the story, one version of the truth.  It is a version that 
is filtered through a client’s imperfect perceptions, biases, and recol-
lections, but that will nevertheless condition the lawyer’s understand-
ing of the case going forward.  This version will shape the mental 
framework through which the lawyer approaches the representation, 
the issues upon which she focuses, and the questions that she asks her 
clients and others. 
As litigation progresses, a lawyer’s initial impressions and under-
standings will frequently be complicated rather than clarified.  
Clients’ memories will change under the force of additional informa-
tion.39  Verbalizations of the event will displace raw recollection and 
will become a part of the remembered experience itself.40  Opposing 
counsel, meanwhile, will offer additional versions of the truth.  Ulti-
mately, there may be as many accounts of the underlying matter as 
there were participants.  As we have noted elsewhere, individuals 
“have different understandings of what is happening in a transaction, 
different subsequent retrospections of what happened, and different 
interpretations of the significance of the event for their continuing 
lives.”41  Allegations, discovery, and disclosures may reduce discrepan-
cies along some lines but will surely compound them along others. 
Amid this uncertainty, lawyers will continually work to understand 
the facts that appear most likely true or at least “approximately” true.  
But the limits of human capacity still bind them, and they cannot be 
expected to discern an objective truth of the dispute. 
Nor can members of the tribunal be expected to discern objective 
truth, notwithstanding their official responsibility to resolve the dis-
pute.  By design, judges and jurors have limited access to first-hand 
knowledge of the underlying matter.  Those who have personal know-
 
39 See MARK PENDERGRAST, VICTIMS OF MEMORY 118 (1995) (“‘In remembering . . . 
people not only distort and interpret information from the past so as to make it fit what 
they know or believe in the present; they seem to add new information.  The more dis-
tant the event, the more material the mind adds.’” (quoting JEREMY CAMPBELL, THE IM-
PROBABLE MACHINE 238 (1989))); James Lang, Note, Hearsay and Relevancy Obstacles to 
the Admission of Composite Sketches in Criminal Trials, 64 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1136 n.189 
(1984) (noting the assumption that observers of crimes will more accurately recall an 
event than will victims). 
40 See Lang, supra note 39, at 1116 n.89 (“Additionally, research has shown that 
during the course of the composite process the eyewitnesses’ original recollection may 
be altered as replicated constructions are made.”). 
41 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet:  An Ex-
tended Analysis, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1041, 1047 (1997). 
HAZARD & REMUS SECOND REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2011  1:10 PM 
762 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 751 
ledge are disqualified from participating.42  Advocates who could be 
witnesses are generally disqualified as well.43  The resulting distance be-
tween members of the tribunal and the events in question is designed 
to ensure objective, unbiased viewpoints.  But the distance allows for 
significant distortion of the information that ultimately reaches the tri-
bunal.  This information necessarily comes through the accounts of 
participants who are available and willing to testify.44  These accounts 
are filtered first through the witnesses’ imperfect perceptions and re-
collections and then through the factfinder’s evaluation of the wit-
nesses’ credibility and reliability.45  Moreover, the admissibility of testi-
mony and other forms of evidence is subject to constitutional doctrines 
and rules of evidence that sometimes prioritize the value of privacy 
over that of truthfulness.  Examples include the exclusionary rule, 
which excludes otherwise relevant evidence that was obtained through 
an illegal search,46 and evidentiary privileges, which allow individuals in 
certain confidential relationships to refuse to testify.47 
 
42 See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 850, 867-68 
(1988) (upholding a decision that the “appearance of impropriety” is sufficient to dis-
qualify a judge who sat on the Board of Trustees of a party with interest in the litiga-
tion’s outcome); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 815-19, 823-24 (1986) 
(holding that an Alabama Supreme Court justice who sued an insurance company 
should have been disqualified from participating in a case against another insurer, the 
outcome of which would possibly affect the justice’s case); Kirk v. Raymark Indus., 61 
F.3d 147, 151-52 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the district court abused its discretion by 
failing to strike for cause jurors with preexisting biases against one party). 
43 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(a) (2009) (noting that, absent 
specific exceptions, a lawyer should not advocate in a trial where it is expected that she 
will be called as a witness); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 108(1)(a)–(b) (2000) (requiring lawyers who are “expected to testify” or whose “tes-
timony would be material to establishing a claim or defense of the client” to refrain 
from participating in the proceedings, with some exceptions). 
44 See, e.g., Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in Judicial 
Fact-Finding—Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW & PHIL. 497, 504 
(1999) (noting the limitations on available testimony and evidence imposed by the 
necessarily limited time frame of factfinding). 
45 See, e.g., Kenneth Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of the Effects of High 
Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 687, 699 (2004) (“[H]igh levels of 
stress negatively impact both accuracy of eyewitness identification as well as accuracy of 
recall of crime-related details.”); Peter J. van Koppen & Shara K. Lochun, Portraying 
Perpetrators:  The Validity of Offender Descriptions by Witnesses, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 661, 
677 (1997) (finding that witnesses tend to identify “general” offender characteristics 
correctly but give “vague” descriptions overall). 
46 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-57 (1961).  
47 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (discussing various privi-
leges); see also Summers, supra note 44, at 501 (discussing the spousal privilege).  These 
evidentiary doctrines may impede the tribunal’s efforts to discern truth, but they are 
thought to be justified by other, superseding values and policies.   
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On the basis of available and admissible evidence, jurors and 
judges piece together an understanding of the dispute that they be-
lieve is most likely true.48  They determine whether a conclusion that 
something did or did not happen is supported by the relevant stan-
dard of proof, be it preponderance of the evidence, clear and con-
vincing evidence, or evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.49  Because 
of these different standards, the same evidence could lead to a finding 
of truthful fact in one case but not in another.50 
In making these determinations, both jurors and judges strive to 
be objective in the sense of being disinterested.  Jurors, as amateurs, 
may even view their job as finding objective truth.  But the tribunal’s 
determination of truth is never certain and absolute.51  It is only “ap-
proximate,” and this “approximate” truth is the basis on which the tri-
bunal reaches judgment. 
Just as in the law courts and deliberative assembly of ancient 
Athens, reaching judgment in our legal system is therefore con-
strained by unavoidable uncertainty.  Also, as in its ancient context, 
our legal system requires reaching judgment as a matter of social ne-
cessity.  Our judicial system exists, after all, to resolve disputes be-
 
As a result of the operation of this rule excluding evidence, the court may, in 
the end, fail to find the true facts. . . . But such resulting divergence between 
formal findings of fact and substantive truth can still be justified on policy or 
other grounds.  It is simply not so that the exclusive business of a trial court in 
all disputed cases is to find the actual truth. 
Summers, supra note 44, at 499-500. 
48 See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 221 (1999) (defending the legi-
timacy of the trial by reference to its potential to “reveal, or at least converge on, the 
truth of a human action”). 
49 Jurors are even instructed that 
 [u]nless and until outweighed by evidence to the contrary, [they] may find 
that official duty has been regularly performed, that private transactions have 
been fair and regular, that the ordinary course of business of employment has 
been followed, that things have happened according to the ordinary course of 
nature and the ordinary habits of life, and that the law has been obeyed.   
3 KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS:  CIVIL 
§ 104.21 (5th ed. 2000). 
50 See Summers, supra note 44, at 506 (“[T]ruth varies with standards of proof, and 
standards of proof vary with what is at stake.”).  Facts against an accused in a criminal 
trial must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, while facts in a civil case must gen-
erally be established by a preponderance of the evidence.  In certain civil cases where 
the stakes are higher, such as where punitive damages may be awarded, courts may re-
quire facts against the defendant to be established by clear and convincing evidence. 
51 See id. at 505 (noting “the risk of divergence between formal legal truth and 
substantive truth” emerging from a trial proceeding). 
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tween parties who cannot reach a mutually agreeable resolution 
themselves.  As we will demonstrate in the next Section, the resulting 
challenges—the challenges of arriving at judgment on the basis of 
“approximate,” rather than objective, truth—justify the means and 
explain the ends of rhetoric in ancient Athens and of advocacy in our 
own litigation system. 
B.  Evaluating Advocacy in Context 
1.  Ancient Athens 
Aristotle elaborates on the techniques of rhetoric through a com-
parison with the techniques of dialectic.  He explains that while both 
rely on logical argument, rhetoric alone relies on two additional 
means of persuasion:  the audience’s perception of the speaker’s cha-
racter and the audience’s emotional response to the speaker’s content 
and delivery.52  Without an appreciation of rhetoric’s social context, 
one might view these additional elements of persuasion as manipula-
tive and improper.  With such an appreciation, however, one can see 
how these elements emerge as important aspects of rhetoric’s re-
sponse to the task that the advocate and the tribunal confront.  They 
are important ways in which a speaker helps an audience make a deci-
sion and take action in the absence of certain and objective truth. 
Aristotle begins his comparison of the two forms of discourse by 
recognizing a similarity between the “demonstration” of dialectic and 
the practical conclusion of rhetoric.  Both forms of analysis have a pa-
rallel logic,53 proceeding by major premise, minor premise, and con-
clusion (deduction), or by reaching a conclusion through examples 
(induction).54  The parallel structure follows.  Dialectic involves syllog-
ism, which relies on deductive reasoning, and induction, which relies 
on inductive reasoning.55  Rhetoric involves enthymeme, which relies 
on deductive reasoning, and example, which relies on inductive rea-
soning.56  This parallel structure is the basis of Aristotle’s assertion that 
 
52 See infra note 62 and accompanying text.    
53 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356b (“[J]ust as in dialectic there 
is induction on the one hand and syllogism or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is 
in rhetoric.”).  
54 See id.         
55 See id.  
56 See id.  
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rhetoric is not a mere “knack” in emotional manipulation, as Plato 
had suggested.57  It is a proper art—“the counterpart of [d]ialectic.”58 
Beyond parallel logical structure, the two forms of analysis di-
verge.  Aristotle explains that dialectic pursues the objective truth of a 
“demonstration” under no time pressure or compulsion to reach a 
conclusion.  It does so in a purely intellectual and disinterested man-
ner, proceeding through logical argument alone.59 
Rhetoric, in contrast, pursues action and decision in response to 
a pressing practical problem.  As a result, Aristotle explains, it cannot 
rely solely on the logically or deontologically “correct” arguments 
that are appropriate for dialectic.60  The certainty of mind that carries 
a person beyond contemplation and into action results from en-
gagement of the “whole” person, not just the intellect.61  To inspire 
action, therefore, rhetoric must engage and appeal to all aspects of 
 
57 See id. ch. 1, at 1354a (arguing that “framers of the current treatises on rhetoric” 
have not fully considered the effort needed to acquire rhetorical skill); see also supra 
note 14 (discussing Plato’s criticism of rhetoric). 
58 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1354a; see also William M.A. Grimaldi, 
Studies in the Philosophy of Aristotle’s Rhetoric (noting that Aristotle views rhetoric’s role as 
presenting dialectic to a listener “in such a way as to make accessible to the other the 
possibility of reasonable judgment”), in LANDMARK ESSAYS ON ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC 
15, 16-17 (Richard Leo Enos & Lois Peters Agnew eds., 1998).  
59 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355a–b (discussing the differences 
between rhetoric and dialectic).   
60 See id. at 1355a (“For argument based on knowledge implies instruction, and there 
are people whom one cannot instruct.”); see also MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discuss-
ing how lawyers employ tactics that may not adhere exactly to ethical rules but that are 
necessary to exploit advantages that their clients may hold in an adversarial proceeding). 
61 In De Anima, Aristotle refers to the emotional component of mental process as 
“appetite,” distinguishing it from reason and suggesting its energetic or impulsive cha-
racter.  ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA bk. III, ch. 9, at 433a (R.D. Hicks trans., Cambridge ed. 
1907).  Various philosophers have subsequently and repeatedly affirmed this insight—
that human action, as opposed to passive contemplation, requires more than purely 
intellectual mental processes.  See, e.g., DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 
bk. I, pt. IV, § V, at 238-39 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 1978) 
(1739) (positing that while the utility of alternative actions can be evaluated through 
reason, decision among alternatives requires an act of the “passions”); FRIEDRICH 
NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER bk. II, § 142, at 91-92 (Walter Kaufmann ed., Walter 
Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., Vintage Books 1968) (referring to the mental 
processes that carry a person into action as “the will to power”); BENEDICTUS DE SPINO-
ZA, THE ETHICS pt. III, prop. 7 (G.H.R. Parkinson ed. & trans., Everyman Classics 1989) 
(1677) (referring to this element of mental processes as “conatus”).  Modern brain re-
search supports, and to some extent explains, the phenomena that these philosophers 
identified.  See, e.g., ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR:  EMOTION, REASON, AND 
THE HUMAN BRAIN, at xi-xiii, 36-51 (1994) (concluding that the brain functions diffe-
rently and implicates distinct mental processes in bringing forth the psychological cer-
titude necessary for action, as opposed to passive thought).   
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the audience’s thought processes.  Aristotle explains that it does so 
through three distinct forms of persuasion:  logical argument (logos), 
the character of the speaker (ethos), and emotional appeal to the au-
dience (pathos).62 
Aristotle recognizes that rhetoric’s emotional appeal risks danger-
ous distraction.63  But he explains that the danger can be avoided if 
the emotional appeal—pathos—is properly employed with and con-
strained by the other elements of persuasion—logos and ethos.64  When 
a speaker employs the three elements together, rhetoric engages, but 
does not dominate, the audience’s emotions.65 
As for the proper balance between these three elements of persu-
asion, Aristotle explains that it varies by context.  It depends on the 
matter to be resolved and the audience to be persuaded.  For exam-
ple, a judge or jury determining the guilt or innocence of an accused 
will not be personally invested in the outcome of a decision and may 
therefore be less likely to detect and guard against inappropriate emo-
tional appeal than will members of a legislative body, who will be per-
sonally affected by their decisions regarding public policy issues.  
Based on these observations, Aristotle concludes that rules prohibiting 
improper emotional tactics are highly desirable in court, but unneces-
sary in the assembly.66 
Aristotle recognizes that there are ethical issues in the practice of 
rhetoric, but he locates them outside of the core act of persuasion.  
Emphasizing that it is a speaker’s use of rhetoric in particular ways 
and to particular ends that determines its ethical character,67 he ex-
plains that rhetoric can, but must not, be used “[to] make people be-
lieve what is wrong.”68  He further explains that rhetoric’s possible 
 
62 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 2, at 1356a.  Aristotle explains that “before 
some audiences not even the possession of the exactest knowledge will make it easy for 
what we say to produce conviction,” id. ch. 1, at 1355a, because purely intellectual ar-
gument, no matter how “exact” and “correct,” is insufficient to inspire decisionmaking 
and action. 
63 See id. at 1354a (analogizing the dangers of appealing to the emotions of judges 
to “warp[ing] a carpenter’s rule before using it”). 
64 See id. ch. 2, at 1356a (describing the “three means of effecting persuasion” and 
the critical role of each). 
65 Id. 
66 See id. ch. 1, at 1355a .   
67 This is surely correct.  It would not be unethical to persuade a child to dress 
warmly after hearing a threatening weather report or to clear a building upon a credi-
ble threat of fire.  But it could be unethical to persuade someone to clear a crowded 
building for false or exploitative reasons. 
68 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch.1, at 1355a.   
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abuse is no argument against its proper use.69  After all, many “things 
that are most useful” offer great benefit when used properly, but 
great harm when not.70 
2.  Our Litigation System 
Aristotle’s insights form the basis of a sound understanding of fo-
rensic advocacy in our contemporary legal system.  They also provide 
an effective response to critics who condemn advocacy as paying insuf-
ficient respect to the goal and value of truth.  To develop this point, we 
examine the role and function of the lawyer-advocate in its contempo-
rary social context—more specifically, in addressing the challenges of 
“practical knowledge” and “approximate truth” inherent in the litiga-
tion process.  We begin at a preliminary stage, prior to the involvement 
of lawyers, when individuals experience and understand an event as 
real and as wrong.  In the useful formula of Professors Felstiner, Abel, 
and Sarat, individuals engage in “naming” (verbalizing the event), 
“blaming” (subjectively fixing responsibility on some person or institu-
tion), and then “claiming” (asserting that someone else is legally re-
sponsible).71  In “claiming,” most individuals verbalize their grievances 
in lay terminology.72  The affected individuals frequently incorporate 
hearsay, irrelevancies, and what lawyers would label mere conclusions.  
Would-be defendants respond in the first instance in similar fashion. 
If the tribunal faced the daunting task of imposing order on these 
lay accounts alone, administering justice would be a drawn-out and 
paralyzing affair.  As illustrated by the petitions of pro se litigants, lay 
accounts hold little meaning in the language and categories of legal 
thought and often remain legally incomprehensible.73  Without trans-
lation to the common language and standards of governing law, the 
tribunal would have difficulty maintaining objectivity in comparing 
and reconciling divergent accounts of the same event or transaction.74  
 
69 Id. at 1355b. 
70 Id.  
71 William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes:  Nam-
ing, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635-36 (1980–81). 
72 Id. at 647. 
73 In Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944), for example, the court dis-
cussed the difficulty that the pro se litigant would have winning his case without the 
assistance of an attorney in formulating a legal claim.  Id. at 775-76.  As a result, many 
federal courts have staff attorney positions devoted to pro se matters.  
74 As discussed above, the nature of human perception and memory ensures that 
the first-person accounts of various parties to a matter will diverge such that there will 
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As Lon Fuller and John Randall explained decades ago in defending 
the adversary system, 
any arbiter who attempts to decide a dispute without the aid of par-
tisan advocacy . . . must undertake, not only the role of judge, but 
that of representative for both of the litigants.  Each of these roles 
must be played to the full without being muted by qualifications de-
rived from the others.  When he is developing for each side the 
most effective statement of its case, the arbiter must put aside his 
neutrality and permit himself to be moved by a sympathetic identifi-
cation sufficiently intense to draw from his mind all that it is capable 
of giving,—in analysis, patience and creative power.  When he re-
sumes his neutral position, he must be able to view with distrust the 
fruits of this identification and be ready to reject the products of his 
own best mental efforts.
75
 
Achieving objectivity in that context exceeds the limits of human ca-
pacity. 
Generally, however, the tribunal does not confront its task alone.  
Most individuals who pursue litigation engage an advocate,76 and the 
advocate facilitates the process through which the tribunal reconciles 
the conflicting accounts.  The advocate does so by translating the 
client’s first-hand account into a legal narrative that presents the tri-
bunal with a view of how the “truth” of the matter appears from a par-
ticular perspective.  The advocate acts as an arbitrageur—or learned 
intermediary—between versions of truth.  She receives one version 
from the client and transmits another version, which holds greater val-
ue and meaning in legal currency, to other actors in the legal system.77 
The advocate accomplishes this translation by bringing to bear 
empathy with both the client and the tribunal.  Empathy with the 
client allows the lawyer to offer the client confidence and strength for 
 
likely be as many first-hand accounts of an event as there were participants.  See supra 
notes 39-41 and accompanying text. 
75 Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility:  Report of the Joint Con-
ference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958). 
76 Of course, exercises in “naming,” “blaming,” and “claiming” do not usually re-
sult in litigation, as many individuals lack connections, resources, or motivation to pur-
sue their grievances.   
77 Professor Markovits appears to agree with this position.  See MARKOVITS, supra 
note 1, at 188-93 (describing the effectiveness of transitioning language from that pro-
vided by the client to the new formulation of the lawyer); see also Daniel Markovits, Ar-
bitration’s Arbitrage:  Social Solidarity at the Nexus of Adjudication and Contract, 59 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 431, 457 (2010) (“[P]articipation in the legal process . . . fundamentally re-
constitutes [disputants’ claims].  It does so by transforming brute demands into asser-
tions of right . . . .”). 
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the ordeal of litigation.78  It also allows the lawyer to comprehend and 
internalize the client’s position and interests, so as to produce a narra-
tive that is respectful of those interests.  The narrative will not neces-
sarily track the client’s account, however.  In some cases, the value of 
the narrative will lie in a departure from the client’s account.  For ex-
ample, a lawyer in a criminal case may recommend that a client assert 
the privilege against self-incrimination, while the client would explain 
and defend her conduct defiantly.  A lawyer in a civil case may rec-
ommend that a client admit liability and contest only the issue of 
damages, although the client considers herself free of any fault. 
In addition to empathizing with the client, the advocate will also 
empathize with the task and the perspective of the tribunal.  This al-
lows her to comprehend the relative persuasiveness of various presen-
tations of the evidence and to construct a narrative that is most likely 
to appear true to the judge and jury.  In doing so, the advocate re-
mains cognizant that a decision requires engagement of the “whole 
person,” and not just the intellect.79  She also remains cognizant that 
many cases, particularly those that reach a jury, are “rationally intrac-
table.”80  She therefore makes an emotional appeal that equates to 
Aristotle’s pathos. 
The advocate is not free, however, to construct any narrative that 
might appeal to her audience’s emotional processes.  Instead, she is 
constrained by requirements that the narrative be based on a plausi-
ble version of the evidence and that it be informed by relevant sub-
stantive and procedural law.  These are logical constraints that equate 
to Aristotle’s logos.  She is also constrained by the requirements of the 
law governing lawyers and the norms of the legal profession.  These 
are ethical constraints that equate to Aristotle’s ethos.  In this way, and 
 
78 For a discussion that may apply to the interpersonal and sympathetic nature of 
the attorney-client relationship, see Darien Shanske, Revitalizing Aristotle’s Doctrine of 
Equity, 4 LAW, CULTURE & THE HUMAN. 352 (2008).  Shanske offers an insightful dis-
cussion of German philosopher Heidegger’s views on Rhetoric, applicable here.  Id. at 
364-73.  Heidegger’s concept of “being” can be achieved, at least in part, through di-
rect interpersonal relationships in which rhetoric is employed as a means of communi-
cation and through which a sense of community is achieved.  Id.  The attorney-client 
relationship can be viewed as one such relationship.  
79 See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.  
80 Hazard, supra note 41, at 1053.  Similarly, as Professor Jerome Michael sug-
gested, “to say that I can decide an issue of fact reasonably either way is to say, I submit, 
that I cannot, by the exercise of reason, decide the question.  That means that the is-
sue which we typically submit to juries is an issue which the jury cannot decide by the 
exercise of its reason.”  Jerome Michael, The Basic Rules of Pleading, 5 REC. OF THE ASS’N 
OF THE B. OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 175, 199-200 (1950). 
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just as Aristotle suggested, the three forms of rhetorical persuasion—
logos, ethos, and pathos—work together and constrain one another.81 
Informed by all three forms of persuasion, the advocate’s narra-
tive will ease the tribunal’s burden in arriving at an accepted and au-
thoritative truth of the dispute.  In most cases, the parties will settle be-
fore trial, relieving the tribunal of this burden.  But even in cases that 
settle, the advocate constructs her legal narrative in anticipation of trial. 
In cases that proceed to trial, the tribunal will consider the various 
perspectives of conflicting narratives and will synthesize them into a 
version that appears most likely and “approximately” true.  In civil law 
terminology, this legally constructed but politically authoritative ver-
sion of truth is called verita processuale—“procedural truth.”82  Proce-
dural truth lacks the certainty of Aristotle’s theoretical truth, but it is 
the authoritative basis for legal judgment.  It is therefore pivotal to the 
administration of justice in our legal system. 
Many critics contend that in facilitating the construction of pro-
cedural truth, advocates show insufficient respect for objective truth.  
These critics base their arguments on two realities of our legal system.  
First, the law governing lawyers does not permit advocates to impose 
their own views of truth and justice on their clients.83  As a result, crit-
ics argue, lawyers are impeded in any attempt to constrain seeming 
perversions of the truth by their clients.  Second, lawyers sometimes 
employ rules of procedure and professional responsibility that priorit-
ize values other than truthfulness, such as confidentiality and privacy 
interests.84  We accept these realities, but we do not think that they 
prove the critics’ conclusion that lawyers disrespect the truth.  We 
note that there are many ways in which an advocate can dissuade a 
client from pursuing an obviously untrue story without reference to 
the advocate’s own beliefs.  She can, for example, explain to the client 
 
81 Cf. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 73 (1999) (“The rules of the trial 
are Plato’s revenge on the rhetoricians.”); James Boyd White, The Ethics of Argument:  Pla-
to’s Gorgias and the Modern Lawyer, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 850 (1983) (“[T]he modern 
lawyer and law teacher . . . in fact are rhetoricians very much as Plato defines them.”). 
82 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS 76 (2004). 
83 The principles of loyalty to the client and client control over the objectives of 
representation preclude the lawyer from doing so.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CON-
DUCT R. 1.2(a) (2009) (“[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by 
which they are to be pursued.”).  For discussion of this argument, see, for example, 
MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 34. 
84 The exclusionary rule and the evidentiary privileges, for example, prioritize pri-
vacy interests over truthfulness.  See supra note 47 and accompanying text.  For further 
discussion of evidentiary issues, see, for example, MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 51-52. 
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that the story will conflict with those of other witnesses and will not 
likely hold up on cross examination.  And the procedural devices that 
protect and advance interests other than the truth do not necessarily 
express or reflect active resistance to the truth.  Rather, they express a 
recognition of the limitations imposed on a legal system that can ad-
minister only justice processuale. 
Throughout the litigation process, advocates constantly and con-
tinually engage the truth of a matter, albeit an “approximate” ver-
sion.  Upon meeting a potential client, advocates evaluate the persua-
siveness of the client’s account in order to determine whether to 
accept or refuse the engagement.  Under cover of attorney-client pri-
vilege, advocates assess their clients’ credibility and confront their 
clients with difficulties or implausibilities in their stories.  In discov-
ery, advocates seek to unearth favorable evidence and take account of 
adverse evidence.  And throughout litigation, advocates continually 
weigh the degree to which various pieces of evidence seem “approx-
imately” true, both individually and in the aggregate.  They remain 
cognizant that undisputed truth generally signifies an end to litiga-
tion through settlement.85 
That advocates pursue and facilitate “approximate,” rather than 
objective, truth does not reflect disrespect for the goal and value of 
truthfulness.  Rather, this process reflects acceptance of and engage-
ment with the social contingency of a legal dispute.  It also reflects ac-
ceptance of the limits of human knowledge and understanding—a 
humility that expresses great respect for the nature and challenges of 
truth in our litigation process. 
If advocacy operated in a world of accessible and objective truth, 
adversarial technique might sometimes, if not always, be characte-
rized as unethical.  As Aristotle recognizes, it is unethical to persuade 
someone of that which is wrong, and in a world of easily accessible 
objective truth, it would always be possible to determine what was 
“wrong.”  But our legal system does not have access to objective truth 
and must resolve disputes on the basis of truths that are socially con-
tingent and ultimately uncertain.  When analyzed and evaluated in 
 
85 While there are many reasons behind the high rate of settlement in our legal 
system, recognition of and respect for undisputed truth is undoubtedly a significant 
factor leading many parties to settle.  Cf. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Set-
tle”:  Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 
(1994) (discussing the difference between using the term “settle” to describe cases that 
“do not go to trial” and to describe cases that are “resolved solely by agreement be-
tween the parties without any decision by an authoritative decisionmaker”).  
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this light, advocacy emerges as an ethically positive and valuable 
means by which our legal system accesses truths that are persuasive 
enough to facilitate judgment. 
II.  ETHICAL ADVOCACY IN THE REAL WORLD 
We do not dispute that adversarial advocacy can be and some-
times is used in improper ways and to improper ends.  In this Part, we 
address two of the deep and prominent flaws in our legal system—
lawyer misconduct and unequal access to legal services.  We argue, 
however, that these are problems of practice that do not detract from 
the ethically positive nature of advocacy’s core function.  As a result, 
they are not properly addressed through many critics’ proposals of 
reconstituting the role of the advocate or the structure of our sys-
tem.86  Rather, they are properly addressed through extrinsic regula-
tory controls on practice, primarily in the form of the law governing 
lawyers and the rules of evidence and procedure.  Specific reform 
proposals are outside of the scope of this Article and are a task for fu-
ture work.  Below, we lay the groundwork by noting a few proposals 
deserving of extended study. 
A.  Lawyer Misconduct 
Lawyer misconduct generally arises in two situations:  where ethi-
cal rules are ambiguous and where enforcement is weak.  The first 
situation is common, given that many rules of practice are stated in 
highly general terms.  For example, the ABA’s Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct instruct that representation must be “competent,”87 
advice must be “candid,”88 and fees must not be “unreasonable.”89  
Even rules addressing more specific practice situations are often 
stated in general terms.  Examples include the rules prohibiting delay 
for the sole purpose of disadvantaging an opponent,90 cross-
examination for the sole purpose of embarrassing a witness,91 and 
abuse of prosecutorial discretion.92 
 
86 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
87 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2009). 
88 Id. R. 2.1. 
89 Id. R. 1.5. 
90 Id. R. 3.2 cmt. 1. 
91 See id. R. 4.4(a) (“In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have 
no substantial purpose other than to embarrass . . . a third person . . . .”). 
92 Id. R. 3.8. 
HAZARD & REMUS SECOND REVISED FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 2/11/2011  1:10 PM 
2011] Advocacy Revalued 773 
Formulating rules in general terms has advantages.  It anticipates 
application of the rules to a diverse range of practice situations and 
offers desired flexibility.93  At the same time, however, such an ap-
proach creates problematic gaps in guidance.94  For example, the dis-
tinction between a reasonable and an unreasonable fee is clear only at 
the extremes,95 leaving much room for questionable and undesirable 
billing practices.  The ambiguity is particularly stark, and particularly 
problematic, in the case of rules requiring reporting of lawyer mis-
conduct.  Model Rule 8.3 requires lawyers to report incidents of mis-
conduct of which they “know[]” and which “raise[] a substantial ques-
tion as to [a] lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in 
other respects.”96 Because there is little consensus as to what level of 
knowledge triggers the Rule’s application and what constitutes a re-
portable offense, few lawyers report peers’ questionable conduct.97  
The problem is exacerbated by the embittering and often ineffective 
nature of the disciplinary process.  The process leads many lawyers to 
believe that reporting misconduct by other lawyers will do little but 
harm their own reputations and relationships.98 
A second and equally pervasive situation in which misconduct 
goes unaddressed is where enforcement is weak.  As an initial matter, 
few reports of misconduct ever reach the relevant disciplinary authori-
 
93 For a discussion of the tension between the advantages and disadvantages of 
breadth and specificity in ethical rules, see Carol Rice Andrews, Highway 101:  Lessons 
in Legal Ethics that We Can Learn on the Road, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 95, 110 (2001). 
94 See John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance 
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965, 974 (1984) (theorizing that uncertainty of legal 
outcomes may create an incentive structure that favors socially suboptimal behavior); 
Sean Keveney, Note, The Dishonesty Rule:  A Proposal for Reform, 81 TEX. L. REV. 381, 382 
(2002) (noting that inconsistently applied rules of law fail to contribute to social order 
and “invite[] the exercise of broad judicial discretion”). 
95 Cf. DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE 159 (2000) (“What consti-
tutes an ‘incompetent’ performance or ‘unreasonable’ fee is difficult to assess except at 
the extremes, and lawyers usually have no incentive to gather the relevant information.”).  
96 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2009). 
97 See Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct:  A 
Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 280-82 (2003) (discussing the ambigu-
ity of Model Rule 8.3); Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, Note, A Current Look at Model 
Rule 8.3:  How Is It Used and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 
749-54 (2003) (discussing reasons that lawyers are hesitant whistleblowers). 
98 See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report Professional Misconduct:  A Practical 
Analysis of Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 176 (1999) (“Attorneys 
are troubled by mandatory reporting requirements because of a general professional 
ambivalence toward those who report others’ wrongdoing to appropriate authorities.”).  
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ties.99  Lawyers rarely report each others’ misconduct.  Judges are simi-
larly reluctant to refer complaints to disciplinary authorities or to ex-
ercise inherent powers to sanction abuse.100  Clients, meanwhile, are 
an unreliable source of information regarding misconduct.101  They 
frequently associate an undesirable outcome with bad lawyering, fail-
ing to distinguish between the merits of a claim and the appropriate-
ness of a lawyer’s conduct. 
Of the small number of lawyer misconduct reports that reach the 
relevant disciplinary bodies, an even smaller number results in discip-
linary action.  In 2002, approximately five percent of complaints were 
found to “warrant formal charges,” and only four percent of com-
plaints led to some form of disciplinary action.102  Further, in a large 
proportion of complaints that resulted in disciplinary action, that ac-
tion consisted only of private sanctions or reprimands; only twenty 
percent of attorneys against whom formal charges were filed were dis-
barred as a result.103  Part of the problem is underfunding and under-
staffing of disciplinary agencies.  Another part of the problem is ex-
cessively close ties between disciplinary agencies and the organized 
bar, raising suspicions that disciplinary boards prioritize the profes-
sion’s interests over the public interest. 
In the resulting gaps in guidance and enforcement, the possibility 
of misconduct survives.  And because of financial and other pressures 
 
99 See Michael J. Burwick, You Dirty Rat!!  Model Rule 8.3 and Mandatory Reporting 
of Attorney Misconduct, 8 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 143 (1994) (“[Model Rule 8.3] has 
been viewed by the profession as a Pandora’s box which attorneys have been reluctant 
to open.”).  
100 In Golden Eagle Distributing Corporation v. Burroughs Corporation, 103 F.R.D. 124 
(N.D. Cal. 1984), the district court found that when local counsel did not “active[ly] 
participat[e] in the preparation or decision to file a paper” that led to Rule 11 sanc-
tions for its authors, local counsel should not receive “sanctions other than criticism 
for their apparent neglect.”  Id. at 125 n.1.  Morover, while this court did impose Rule 
11 sanctions on the primary firm, such sanctions were later reversed by the Ninth Cir-
cuit.  Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).  
101 See RHODE, supra note 95, at 159 (“Clients frequently lack sufficient informa-
tion or incentives to file grievances.”); DEBORAH L. RHODE & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, 
JR., PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 264-65 (2d ed. 2007) (explaining 
that clients are rarely motivated to “initiate disciplinary proceedings” due to the na-
ture of the system). 
102 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 1142-43 
(4th ed. 2005) (citing ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSBILITY, 2002 ABA SURVEY ON 
LAWYER DISCIPLINE SYSTEMS (S.O.L.D.), at Chart I, available at http://www.abanet.org/ 
cpr/discipline/sold/toc_2002.html (follow “Chart I” hyperlink)). 
103 Id. at 1143 (citing ABA CTR. FOR PROF’L RESPONSBILITY, supra note 102, at 
Charts I and II).  
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for persuasion at all costs, the possibility often becomes a probability.104  
But lawyer misconduct is neither inevitable nor preordained by the 
structure of our legal system.  If it were, we would expect misconduct 
to be universal.  But this is not the case.  Many lawyers conduct them-
selves appropriately and ethically, even in our underenforced system. 
Nevertheless, many critics argue that the only way to address the 
problem of lawyer misconduct in our legal system is to reconstitute 
the system and the constituent role of the advocate.105  They would do 
so by shifting the relevant regulatory regime from one that relies on 
extrinsic controls of lawyer conduct to one that relies on intrinsic 
conditioning of lawyers’ morals.106  We find this approach misguided 
for a number of reasons. 
First, if the critics’ causal assumption is incorrect—if the structure 
of our system is not the root cause of problems in the practice of ad-
vocacy—adoption of their proposals would not remedy the problems 
of lawyer misconduct and would arguably lead to more egregious 
abuses.  To the extent the critics would abandon extrinsic regulatory 
controls in favor of intrinsic moral conditioning, adoption of their 
proposals would eliminate an important check on blatant misconduct 
and create an intolerable risk of abuse. 
Second, the critics’ approach would jeopardize fundamental indi-
vidual rights and constitutional protections.107  It would qualify the du-
ties of confidentiality and loyalty.  This qualification, in turn, could in-
terfere with clients’ fundamental interests in autonomy, dignity, and 
privacy.  In the criminal context, it could compromise the right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel, the right against self-incrimination, and 
the presumption of innocence.108 
 
104 Fee agreements often contribute to this problem. 
That is one of the great disadvantages of our adversary system:  fees are mostly 
dependent on whether lawyers win or lose for their clients.  This heavy em-
phasis on winning produces its own subtle corruption as they appeal to every 
procedural trick to delay, discourage, hide, obfuscate, and finally destroy the 
truth of the matter. 
Peter J. Riga, The Nature of Truth and Dissent, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 71, 75-76 (1995). 
105 See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 
106 Id. 
107 See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2-3 
(1975) (explaining the significance of the criminal defendant’s constitutionally pro-
tected liberties and the role of the defense attorney as protector of those liberties, even 
when they conflict with the truth-seeking function of the trial). 
108 As one of us has noted elsewhere: 
The consequences of an alternative model are readily apparent in many totali-
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Third, adoption of the critics’ approach could decrease the per-
ceived legitimacy of our legal system.  Most litigants’ perceptions of 
justice turn more on the opportunity to be heard in court pursuant to 
fair and predictable procedures than on the substantive outcome of a 
case.109  And to most litigants, representation by a loyal advocate is an 
indispensable feature of a fair hearing. 
Finally, in blaming the system for lawyer misconduct, critics who 
propose an intrinsic moral solution ironically imply a lack of moral 
agency among lawyers.  Some lawyers undoubtedly hide behind pro-
fessional obligations of zealous advocacy while engaging in questiona-
ble conduct.  But scholarly accounts that accept this excuse give it un-
fortunate credence.  Such accounts also fail to recognize the highly 
complex nature of the moral agency of the advocate, accounting as it 
does for the necessity of proceeding on the basis of available evidence 
and approximate truth. 
The critics’ approach diverts attention from what we believe to be 
the proper focus of reform efforts—the extrinsic regulatory controls 
of procedural rules, rules of evidence, and the law governing lawyers.  
These controls seek to set the moral risk of the lawyer-advocate’s func-
tion at a socially accepted level by counterbalancing economic pres-
sures on lawyer-advocates to engage in questionable or improper con-
duct.  To the extent that lawyers are exhibiting the dishonesty and 
deceit that critics allege, the current risk level may be too high.  The 
proper response, we would suggest, is sustained attention to specific 
and incremental reform efforts.  For purposes of illustration, we brief-
ly note a few proposals regarding the law governing lawyers. 
 
tarian countries that lack an adversarial process and an independent profes-
sion.  Where defense lawyers’ role is to “serve justice,” rather than their 
clients, what passes for “justice” often is simply deference to prosecutorial au-
thority. . . . In the long run, providing adversarial protections for individuals 
who are guilty also protects those who are not. 
RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 101, at 57. 
109 See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL 
JUSTICE 64-67 (1988) (summarizing studies indicating that litigants evaluate legal out-
comes based on whether they considered the proceedings to be fair).  In large part, this 
may be why certain arbitration programs have been highly successful.  See, e.g., NAT’L 
CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CIVIL PROGRAMS IN THE PHILADELPHIA COURT OF COMMON 
PLEAS:  FINAL REPORT, at iv-v (2004), available at http://courts.phila.gov/pdf/report/ 
NSCS-Civil-Final-Report.pdf (outlining the success of Philadelphia’s compulsory arbitra-
tion program); see also COMPULSORY ARBITRATION CTR., CIVIL ADMINISTRATION AT A 
GLANCE 2005-2006, at 1, http://courts.phila.gov/pdf/manuals/civil-trial/compulsory-
arbitration-center.pdf (discussing Philadelphia’s arbitration process). 
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With respect to the problem of ambiguous ethical rules that offer 
insufficient guidance, one approach would be to give greater and 
more detailed attention to specific fields of practice through stan-
dards of good practice.  The American College of Trust and Estate 
Counsel has issued the ACTEC Commentaries, which offer ethical 
guidance specific to trusts and estates practice.110  The American 
Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers has adopted similar standards for 
family law practice.111 Alternatively, more context-specific guidance 
could be given in the Rules of Professional Conduct.  We have else-
where proposed a revised, context-specific no-contact rule to replace 
existing Model Rule 4.2.112  Following this approach, we could address 
the critics’ central concern—that some lawyers seem to show insuffi-
cient respect for the truth—by offering rules of candor that give more 
specific guidance in specific contexts. 
With respect to the problem of ineffective enforcement—against, 
for example, lawyers engaged in intentional malfeasance—one pro-
posal, frequently advanced, would be to increase public reporting by 
increasing public information regarding the disciplinary process and 
the profession’s ethical standards.  Some commentators have pro-
posed establishing a clearinghouse of information regarding lawyers 
that would include performance records, malpractice coverage, and 
history of professional discipline.113  This approach, however, does not 
 
110 AM. COLL. OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL FOUND., COMMENTARIES ON THE 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (4th ed. 2006).  
111 Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children:  Standards for Attorneys 
and Guardians Ad Litem in Custody or Visitation Proceedings (with Commentary), 13 J. AM. 
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1 (1995). 
112 See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana Remus Irwin, Toward a Revised 4.2 
No-Contact Rule, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 797 (2009).  Model Rule 4.2 generally prohibits a 
lawyer from “communicat[ing] about the subject of the representation with a person 
the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter.”  MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2009).  We observed that proper application of this rule ap-
pears quite different in a criminal matter (for example, where a prosecutor inappro-
priately approaches a defendant who has invoked his constitutional right to counsel), 
Hazard & Irwin, supra, at 816-18, than in a family matter (for example, where a lawyer 
seeks to communicate directly and quickly with a represented spouse concerning a po-
tential threat to his or her safety), id. at 829-30.  Accordingly, we proposed a revised 
rule that specified proper application in various contexts.  Id. at 848-51.  A similar 
analysis applies to many other rules, and a potentially fruitful approach would be to 
create context-specific standards. 
113 See, e.g., RHODE & HAZARD, supra note 101, at 267 (advocating for “data banks 
and toll-free hotlines that would provide information about judicial sanctions, discipli-
nary actions, and malpractice judgments”); Steven K. Berenson, Is It Time for Lawyer 
Profiles?, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 645, 690 (2001) (“[E]ven if the time for lawyer profiles 
isn’t this moment, that time should be coming relatively soon.”); cf. RHODE, supra note 
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address the central problem of client reporting, which is that relatively 
few clients distinguish between the desirability of an outcome and the 
appropriateness of a lawyer’s conduct.  A better approach may be to 
rely on independent government supervision and regulation of lawyer 
conduct.  Particularly in states where disciplinary authorities have 
close ties to the organized bar, promising reforms would focus on in-
creasing both independence and accountability.114 
B.  Unequal Access to Competent Legal Services 
A second prominent difficulty with the practice of advocacy in our 
legal system stems from unequal access to legal services.  As Professor 
Deborah Rhode has summarized: 
Th[e] [conventional] model presupposes adversaries with roughly 
equal incentives, resources, capabilities, and access to relevant in-
formation.  But those conditions are more the exception than the 
rule in a society that tolerates vast disparities in wealth, high litiga-
tion costs, and grossly inadequate access to legal assistance. . . . In 
law, as in life, the haves generally come out ahead.
115
 
When opposing parties are represented by advocates of significantly di-
vergent skill, that divergence may dictate the case’s outcome.  As one of 
us has commented elsewhere, “[t]he blunt truth is that some decisions 
by the courts result from the fact that the advocate for one side was 
more clever, more steadfast, more patient, more diligent, or simply had 
a better day than the opponent.”116  Problems of divergent skill are 
compounded when opposing parties have unequal resources with 
which to fund representation.117  At one end of the spectrum are indi-
 
95, at 163 (concluding that the ABA’s rejection of a proposal for increased public dis-
closure of disciplinary complaints was motivated by lawyers’ self-interest). 
114 See RHODE, supra note 95, at 162 (arguing that a commission under control of a 
state’s supreme court but “independent of the organized bar” would help produce a 
“regulatory structure more responsive to the public interest than the prevailing sys-
tem”); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation:  Who Should 
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1185-
1204 (2003) (discussing the independence of state courts). 
115 RHODE, supra note 95, at 55-56. 
116 HAZARD & DONDI, supra note 82, at 69; see also Helen B. Kim, Legal Education for 
the Pro Se Litigant:  A Step Towards a Meaningful Right to Be Heard, 96 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644 
(1987) (recognizing that the adversarial system is prone to unfairness for those who do 
not “assert effectively legal rights”). 
117 See, e.g., Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied:  The Overdue 
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 59, 70-72 (2007) (citing statistics 
showing that pro se litigants are far less likely to file motions, request discovery, receive 
continuances, and raise substantive claims and defenses than are litigants represented 
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vidual clients who cannot afford a lawyer at all.  At the other end of the 
spectrum are sophisticated and wealthy clients who have the resources 
to “play for the rules.”  It may be relatively rare that the opposing ends 
of the spectrum meet in a single case, but it is not rare to find a signifi-
cant imbalance of power and resources between opposing litigants.118 
Similar to the problem of lawyer misconduct, unequal access to 
legal services is not a challenge that originates within the structure of 
our legal system.119  Rather, it is a product of power and wealth dispari-
ties that pervade society at large.  Our legal system cannot resolve 
these disparities, but it can mitigate their impact by increasing the 
availability of low-or-no-cost legal services.  One approach, supported 
by many commentators, is to establish a right to counsel in civil cas-
es.120  Implementing such a right faces significant obstacles, however, 
such as funding and determining to which cases the right would ap-
ply.121  More incremental approaches may therefore be more realistic 
and effective.  Legal services could be unbundled so that lawyers could 
offer targeted, limited representation,122 or unauthorized practice of 
 
by lawyers); Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 503, 506 (1998) (arguing in favor of a right to counsel “whenever access to 
the justice system is warranted” because of the high costs to society of unfair proceed-
ings stemming from unequal representation). 
118 See generally Marc Galanter, Why the ‘Haves’ Come Out Ahead:  Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing the advantages enjoyed 
by “repeat players”). 
119 Cf. MARKOVITS, supra note 1, at 201 n.*, 202-03 (arguing that eliminating parti-
sanship advocacy would be an ineffective response to the problems of unequal distri-
bution of legal services). 
120  See Bruce A. Boyer, Justice, Access to the Courts, and the Right to Free Counsel for Indi-
gent Parents:  The Continuing Scourge of Lassiter v. Department of Social Services of Dur-
ham, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 363, 379-80, 380 n.83 (2005) (citing commentators who have 
made this argument); Joan Grace Ritchey, Limits on Justice:  The United States’ Failure to 
Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH. U.L.Q. 317, 318 (2001) (arguing 
that the United States should “follow the lead” of other industrialized societies that are 
more protective of the right to counsel). 
121 Proponents respond that these problems of implementation should not be 
deemed fatal.  They note that the same problems have been overcome in the criminal 
context, and they argue that there is often as much at stake in civil cases as in criminal 
cases.  See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 117, at 73 (suggesting that civil matters, such as 
homelessness from eviction or loss of custody of a child, may present greater stakes for 
the indigent civil litigant than for the criminal defendant).  Proponents also reference 
successful implementation of a right to counsel in civil cases in other countries, includ-
ing England, Canada, and Australia.  See Ritchey, supra note 120, at 331-36 (citing six-
teen countries that provide attorneys for indigent civil litigants and discussing the im-
plementations of such systems in England, Germany, and Switzerland). 
122 Given the number of young lawyers admitted to the bar each year notwith-
standing the already saturated nature of the legal services marketplace, many lawyers 
would likely be willing to offer unbundled and comparatively inexpensive legal servic-
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law rules could be relaxed so that paralegals and other nonlawyer pro-
fessionals could offer specific, limited services.  Low-cost legal services 
could be delivered at walk-in legal clinics, much as low-cost health ser-
vices are delivered at walk-in medical clinics.123  Other promising pro-
posals include increasing the availability of free legal information re-
sources124 and encouraging reliance on arbitration proceedings as a 
lower-cost alternative to traditional litigation.125  Proposals such as 
these, which target specific problems of practice, deserve and demand 
sustained attention and consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
We have defended our system of adversarial advocacy not as capa-
ble of discovering objective truth, but as capable of constructing legi-
timate and authoritatively accepted truth.126  We have defended good 
lawyers—those who are effective and ethical—as playing a critical role 
 
es. See, e.g., Mark Greenbaum, Op-Ed., No More Room at the Bench, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2010, at A27, available at 2010 WLNR 388882 (admonishing the ABA for failing to 
“properly regulate” law schools and advocating government intervention to ease the 
oversaturation within the legal profession); Gerry Shih, Downturn Dims Prospects Even at 
Top Law Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2009, at B1 (discussing the difficult job market 
for law school graduates). 
123 In fact, low-cost legal clinics are already being organized in this fashion.  For 
spirited commentary on this development, see, for example, Elie Mystal, The Wal-Mart 
of Law Firms Might Be Wal-Mart, ABOVE THE LAW (Nov. 16, 2009, 4:12 PM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2009/11/the-wal-mart-of-law-firms-might-be-wal-mart.  Other 
similar solutions that have been implemented include a coffee shop where drop-ins 
can seek legal advice.  See LEGAL GRIND, http://www.legalgrind.com (last visited Nov. 
15, 2010). 
124 Many efforts have been made to make legal information resources more freely 
available, which could lead to a substantial reduction in the cost of legal services. Tra-
ditionally, Westlaw and Lexis were the only available online databases, both very ex-
pensive.  Now, there are several free alternatives, including Google Scholar, 
http://scholar.google.com/advanced_scholar_search (last visited Nov.. 15, 2010); Cor-
nell University Law School’s Legal Information Institute, http://www.law.cornell.edu 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2010); various court and agency websites, such as the website of 
the Third Judicial Circuit, which includes an opinion archive, http:// 
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/indexsearch/archives.asp (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); and various 
other free legal information websites, including BitLaw, http://www.bitlaw.com (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2010); FindLaw, http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Nov.15, 2010); 
and Justia, http://www.Justia.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2010).  
125 See, e.g., Am. Acad. of Matrimonial Lawyers, supra note 111, at 18 (encourag-
ing settlement through mediation or other alternatives to avoid “acrimonious” family 
law disputes). 
126 Professor Markovits appropriately points out that production of an authorita-
tive version of the truth, in turn, can give rise to political legitimacy.  MARKOVITS, supra 
note 1, at 171-211.  
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in this process.  We acknowledge that, as implemented, our adversari-
al system has numerous flaws, and, as practiced, advocacy can be 
abused.  But we argue that these evils lie in the practice, and not the 
core function, of adversarial advocacy. 
Addressing the practice of rhetoric in ancient Athens, Aristotle 
commented that it could be used for good or evil, but that its poten-
tial for abuse was no reason to condemn its proper use.127  In evaluat-
ing the role of advocacy in our contemporary legal system, we might 
heed the wisdom of the ancients. 
 
 
127 ARISTOTLE, supra note 12, bk. I, ch. 1, at 1355b. 
